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Kickbacks, Honest Services, and Health Care Fraud 
After Skilling 
Joan H Krause· 
This essay considers how the 2010 Supreme Court decision in Skilling v. 
United States', which limited the situations in which mail and wire fraud 
cases may be premised on violations of the "intangible right to honest 
services," has the potential to alter the future of health care fraud 
enforcement. To be clear, Skilling was not a healthcare case. Rather, the 
litigation stemmed from the investigation of Enron's former CEO, Jeffrey 
Skilling, who was accused of engaging in a conspiracy to commit honest 
services wire fraud as well as multiple forms of securities-related fraud. In 
rejecting a vagueness challenge to the honest services theory, however, the 
Court read the statute in a very narrow way that puts kickbacks and bribery 
cases squarely in the crosshairs, an approach that may have serious 
implications for healthcare fraud. 
To understand the significance of Skilling, it is necessary to appreciate 
the context in which healthcare fraud cases arise under current law. To that 
end, this essay begins by providing a brief overview of current health care 
fraud enforcement and of the Medicare & Medicaid Anti-Kickback Statute,2 
one of the main tools used to combat health care fraud and the law most 
likely to be affected by Skilling. After a brief introduction to the mail and 
wire fraud statutes, the essay turns to the implications of the Skilling 
decision for honest services in health care. I conclude that while Skilling is 
perceived to have narrowed the scope of the honest services doctrine 
overall, it may have the somewhat counterintuitive effect of encouraging 
the government to bring additional healthcare honest services prosecutions. 
I. HEALTHCARE FRAUD IN CONTEXT
Recent years have seen many revisions to the health care anti-fraud laws, 
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1. Skilling v. United States, 130 S. Ct. 2896, 2926 (2010).
2. 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7b(b) (2011).
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an escalation in anti-fraud rhetoric from the Executive and Congressional 
branches, and a host of stories in the popular media from sources such as 60 
Minutes. 3 Lest we think healthcare fraud is a new phenomenon, however, 
we should remember that in the mid-1990's, then-Attorney General Janet 
Reno designated healthcare fraud as the "number two" priority of the 
Department of Justice ("DOJ"), second only to violent crime.4 While anti-
terrorism concerns have of course been paramount since September 11, 
health care fraud remains a key element of the DOJ's post-Enron focus on 
corporate wrongdoing. 
The main reason the federal government is concerned about health care 
fraud is the amount of federal money at stake, most notably through the 
Medicare and Medicaid programs. A major problem, however, is the 
uncertainty regarding how much money truly is at risk. While the claim 
often is made that up to ten percent of healthcare expenditures may be 
fraudulent (a total of somewhere between $60 and $100 billion dollars a 
year), these numbers really have no solid empirical basis. The sad truth is 
that we do not know for sure how much money we lose to healthcare fraud, 
in large part because if a scheme is successful, we may never even know it 
exists. 
Since the mid-1990's, concern over the incidence of health care fraud has 
led Congress to appropriate more funds to the federal agencies with 
jurisdiction over the industry, including the DOJ and the Department of 
Health and Human Services ("HHS") Office of the Inspector General 
("OIG"). The framework for modem healthcare fraud enforcement derives 
from the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 
("HIP AA"), which defined new crimes applicable to those who defraud 
public or private healthcare benefit programs; directed more funds to 
federal investigatory and enforcement agencies; expanded the grounds for 
and length of time that wrongdoers could be excluded from the federal 
health care programs; and increased both the number of activities subject to 
civil monetary penalties ("CMPs") and the penalty amounts.5 HIPAA also 
created the Health Care Fraud and Abuse Control Program ("Control 
Program") to coordinate federal, state, and local fraud enforcement efforts. 
The Centerpiece of the Control Program is the Health Care Fraud and 
Abuse Control Account ("Control Account"), which provides funding for 
future HHS and DOJ anti-fraud efforts. In loose terms, the money 
recovered through federal health care fraud enforcement is deposited into 
3. See, e.g., 60 Minutes: The $60 Billion Fraud (CBS News broadcast Oct. 25, 2009), 
available at http://www.cbsnews.com/video/watch/?id=5419844n. 
4. See JANET RENO, 1994 ANN. REP. OF ATT'Y GEN. OF U.S. (1994), 
http://www.justice.gov/archive/ag/annualreports/ar94/finalag.txt. 
5. Health Insurance Portability And Accountability Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-191, 
110 Stat. 1936 (1996). 
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the Medicare Trust Fund, but can be transferred to the Control Account 
( within broad statutory limits) at the discretion of the Attorney General and 
the Secretary of HHS. This approach has been expanded in nearly all 
subsequent legislation related to the federal health care programs; indeed, 
the recent Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act of 2010 ("ACA") 
contained no shortage of pro-enforcement provisions, ranging from 
increased enforcement budgets to the expansion of CMPs and significant 
amendments to the major civil and criminal anti-fraud laws.6 
These enforcement efforts have paid off, at least to a certain extent. The 
federal government won or negotiated approximately $2.5 billion in 
healthcare fraud judgments and settlements in fiscal year 2010. 
Approximately $2.86 billion was returned to the Medicare Trust Fund, with 
an additional $683.2 million returned to the Federal Treasury through 
Medicaid anti-fraud efforts.7 It is difficult to judge the effectiveness of anti-
fraud efforts by focusing on recoveries in any single year, chiefly because 
numbers can be skewed by big recoveries that are negotiated in one year but 
not collected until subsequent years. Overall, however, more than $18 
billion has been returned to the Medicare Trust Fund since the Control 
Program began in 1997. 
These recent efforts are perhaps best described as illustrating a "law 
enforcement" approach to healthcare fraud prevention. Everyone wants to 
be tough on fraud, and the easiest way to do that is to increase penalties, 
enact new laws prohibiting ever more specific types of fraudulent activities, 
and channel more money to federal investigators and prosecutors to use 
these new laws - essentially the model created by HIPAA. Unfortunately, 
it is not clear that increasing law enforcement, at least the way we have 
been doing it, is particularly effective. In fact, there is a compelling 
literature to suggest that the traditional law enforcement paradigm may be 
precisely the wrong way to go about reducing health care fraud. 
Our current health care reimbursement model often is referred to as "pay 
and chase": the federal health care programs (and private insurers) pay 
claims first, audit those claims months ( or sometimes years) later, and only 
then try to hunt down the wrongdoers and recover benefits wrongly paid 
out. This is, to put it mildly, not a particularly efficient system. These 
enforcement efforts are consistent with basic criminal deterrence theory, 
which aims to deter unwanted behavior by ( 1) increasing the penalties for 
those who are convicted, and (2) increasing the chances of perpetrators 
being caught. In the context of a heavily regulated government program, 
6. See Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-148 (2010). 
7. U.S. DEP'T. OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS. & U.S. DEP'T. OF JUSTICE (DOJ), HEALTH 
CARE FRAUD & ABUSE CONTROL PROGRAM ANNUAL REPORT FOR FISCAL YEAR 2010 1 (Jan. 
2011), available at http://www.justice.gov/dag/pubdoc/hcfacreport2010.pdf. 
140 Annals of Health Law - ASLME Special Edition [Vol. 21 
however, a third strategy bears consideration: decreasing the opportunities 
for perpetrators to commit crimes in the first place. Strategies designed to 
decrease billing ambiguities and loopholes and to increase oversight over 
claims before they are paid may well have a more positive effect over the 
long term, yet they have not been our focus thus far. 8 
Fortunately, we have seen some recent movement in this direction, 
including certain provisions in the ACA itself. But perhaps the best 
example is the Health Care Fraud Prevention & Enforcement Action Team 
("HEAT"), a joint 2009 HHS-DOJ initiative designed to proactively 
investigate and identify healthcare fraud, in part by utilizing state-of-the-art 
technology to analyze electronic claims data in near real-time to identify 
questionable billing patterns. The future of anti-fraud efforts likely will be 
focused much more closely on increased prepayment oversight and scrutiny 
of providers before they submit bills. But to the extent these more mundane 
tasks don't tend to make headlines the way that passing new anti-fraud laws 
or increasing penalties might do, we likely will contend with the 
prominence of the law enforcement paradigm for a long time to come. In 
that context, Skilling may offer prosecutors an attractive tool. 
II. THE MEDICARE AND MEDICAID ANTI-KICKBACK STATUTE 
The Medicare and Medicaid Anti-Kickback Statute ("AKS") is the main 
federal fraud law applicable to financial relationships within the health care 
market, including relationships between providers and their patients and 
between healthcare manufacturers and their customers. At its core, the law 
is designed to ensure that decisions about purchasing and ordering health 
care items and services are not swayed by impermissible financial 
influences. To accomplish that goal, the AKS prohibits the knowing and 
willful offer, payment, solicitation, or receipt of any form of remuneration 
designed to induce someone to refer patients or to purchase, lease, order, or 
recommend any item or service for which payment may be made under a 
federal health care program.9 Federal health care programs include not only 
Medicare and Medicaid, but also programs such as the Veterans 
Administration. 
Several aspects of the statute are notable. Both parties to a transaction 
are vulnerable, although it is possible that only one will be found to have 
the requisite intent. Prohibited remuneration broadly includes payments 
made "directly or indirectly, overtly or covertly, in cash or in kind," 
extending beyond simple kickbacks and bribes to reach not only the 
8. See, e.g., MALCOLM K. SPARROW, LICENSE TO STEAL: How FRAUD BLEEDS AMERICA'S 
HEALTH CARE SYSTEM 222-24, 243-45 (2000). 
9. 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7b(b) (2011). 
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exchange of money, but really anything of value. '0 While remuneration 
must be offered or paid "knowingly and willfully," neither actual 
knowledge of the prohibition nor the specific intent to violate the statute is 
required. 
The penalties for violating the statute are severe, including both criminal 
and civil/ administrative sanctions. A violation is a felony punishable by up 
to five years in prison and a fine of up to $25,000. 11 Upon conviction, the 
defendant is subject to the administrative remedy of exclusion from all 
federal health care programs, a potentially fatal blow for entities that derive 
substantial revenue from federal program business. Alternatively, OIG may 
seek to impose permissive exclusion in lieu of criminal prosecution. The 
government also has the authority to impose a CMP of $50,000 for each 
violation, plus three times the amount of remuneration. Finally, AKS 
allegations may be brought as Civil False Claims Act suits, both by federal 
prosecutors and by private qui tam relators. 12 Administrative enforcement 
of the statute is handled by OIG, while DOJ and the United States 
Attorneys' Offices oversee criminal and civil litigation. 
The AKS is well-known to attorneys who advise clients on health care 
transactions, to the OIG personnel who offer guidance on how the law will 
apply and enforce the law at the administrative level, and to federal 
prosecutors who focus on healthcare fraud. But, at least historically, many 
AKS allegations have been disposed of through civil or administrative 
negotiations rather than through criminal prosecution. The Skilling opinion 
has the potential to change that dynamic by strengthening the government's 
motivation to pursue violations criminally - not as AKS prosecutions per 
se, but rather through the mail and wire fraud statutes. 
III. MAIL AND WIRE FRAUD 
The mail and wire fraud statutes are wonderfully versatile laws that 
allow the federal government to prosecute crimes involving both public and 
private fraud schemes. Both crimes require devising a scheme or artifice to 
defraud or to obtain money or property by means of false or fraudulent 
pretenses - a very broad reach that applies to fraud in both the public and 
private sectors. For what is now almost solely jurisdictional purposes, mail 
fraud requires the use of the mails in furtherance of the scheme ( either the 
United States mail or a private or commercial interstate carrier), while wire 
fraud requires the interstate or foreign use of wire, radio, or television 
10. Id. §1320a-7b(b)(l) & (2). 
11. Id. § 1320a-7b. 
12. 31 U.S.C. § 3729-30 (2011) (causes of action, including qui tam actions by private 
persons). 
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Mail and wire fraud cases fall into three general categories: those 
involving a scheme to defraud a victim of (a) tangible property (in most 
cases, money), (b) intangible property (such as information or intellectual 
property) and, most importantly for our purposes, (c) the intangible right to 
honest services. Prior to 1987, courts routinely interpreted the mail and 
wire fraud statutes to encompass schemes to defraud victims of the "right to 
honest and faithful services" by a public official or private employee - for 
example, a bribe offered in connection with a state government contract. In 
the 1987 case of McNally v. United States, however, the Supreme Court 
held that the mail and wire fraud statutes did not reach frauds involving 
intangible rights, but were instead limited to frauds involving money or 
property. 14 In response, Congress quickly enacted 18 U.S.C. § 1346, 
clarifying that the mail and wire fraud prohibitions indeed encompassed 
schemes "to deprive another of the intangible right of honest services." 
While the amendment generally is accepted to have returned the statute to 
the pre-McNally state of the law, it remains controversial because it 
includes no definitions to narrow this potentially expansive theory of 
liability. 
Against this background, Jeffrey Skilling challenged his conviction for 
conspiracy to commit wire fraud via an honest services theory by arguing 
that § 1346 was unconstitutionally vague. The Supreme Court, in an 
opinion written by Justice Ginsburg, rejected Skilling's argument, holding 
that § 1346 should be construed more narrowly. Looking to the history of 
the pre-McNally case law, the majority determined "that § 1346 
criminalizes only the bribe-and-kickback core of the pre-McNally case law," 
not "undisclosed self-dealing by a public officer or private employee ... to 
further his own undisclosed financial interests" - the crime that Skilling 
himself was accused of committing. 15 The Court upheld this narrow 
construction of the statute, while remanding Skilling's case for further 
proceedings. 
IV. THE IMPLICATIONS OF SKILLING FOR ANTI-KICKBACK CASES 
While Skilling has no direct application to health law, it nonetheless 
appears to open the door to more health care honest services prosecutions. 
As a preliminary matter, we have to consider what types of intangible rights 
might be implicated in health care. Two distinct categories of healthcare 
relationships come to mind in which a physician may owe a duty to provide 
honest services. First, a physician who violates either the law or a contract 
13. 18 u.s.c. §§ 1341, 1343, 1346 (2011). 
14. McNally v. United States, 483 U.S. 350 (1987). 
15. Skilling, 130 S. Ct. at 2931. 
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term by giving or accepting kickbacks in connection with services covered 
under insurance (including Medicare and Medicaid) might be viewed as 
depriving the insurer of honest and faithful services. Second - and likely 
more compelling - a physician who pays or accepts kickbacks in 
connection with providing medical services might be said to deprive his or 
her patients of honest and faithful services. Both theories tum on the idea, 
which admittedly remains controversial, that a duty to provide honest 
services arises by virtue of the physician's status as a fiduciary in these 
contexts. 
Perhaps surprisingly, there are few reported cases on this issue. Indeed, 
the two most oft-cited cases, both dating back to the mid-1990's, reached 
largely opposite conclusions. In the only appellate decision on point, 
United States v. Jain, the government alleged that payments of $1,000 per 
month by a psychiatric hospital to a psychologist for "marketing" services 
were in reality payments made in return for his referral of patients to the 
hospital. 16 Rejecting the allegations, the Eight Circuit found that the 
government had failed to prove a scheme to defraud because there was no 
evidence of any tangible harm to patients, nor any proof that Dr. Jain 
intended to cause such harm. Instead, the evidence established that the 
hospital provided quality psychiatric services and was as good (or better) 
than the alternative facilities in the area, that all the patients required 
hospitalization, and that there had been no financial harm to any patient. If 
the client is not harmed because the alleged breach did not affect the 
services that were rendered, the court asked, how can we say the right to 
"honest services" has been violated? While prosecutors argued that § 1346 
applied to unethical violations of a professional's fiduciary duty to provide 
honest services, the court held that nondisclosure by a fiduciary must be 
material in order to be actionable - and there was no evidence that the 
patients would have considered the hospital's payments to be material 
under these facts. 
In contrast, a federal district court came to a different conclusion in 
United States v. Neufeld. 17 Dr. Neufeld had entered into an alleged 
"consulting" arrangement with Caremark, a home infusion company to 
which he referred his Medicaid patients with AIDS. As in Jain, the 
government claimed the payment really was compensation for his patient 
referrals. In denying a motion to dismiss, the district court held that the 
intangible rights theory required a fiduciary relationship, and no such 
relationship existed between the doctor and the Medicaid program. There 
was, however, evidence of a fiduciary relationship between the physician 
and his patients. 
16. U.S. v. Jain, 93 F.3d. 436 (8th Cir. 1996). 
17. U.S. v. Neufeld, 908 F. Supp. 491 (S.D. Ohio 1995). 
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[F]iduciary duty encompasses more than mere disclosure. If Dr. Neufeld 
solicited bribes or remuneration in return for referring his patients to 
Caremark, as it is alleged, then the health of his patients was certainly not 
his only concern. His patients deserved medical opinions and referrals 
unsullied by mixed motives. 18 
The Court went on to note that the intangible rights theory, by definition, 
implicates deception that goes beyond simply defrauding a victim of money 
or property. Moreover, the court noted, the case did in fact involve a stream 
of money flowing from Caremark to Dr. Neufeld. Citing long-standing 
precedent, the Neufeld court noted that the money need not be received 
from the victim in order to qualify as a violation of the doctrine. 
It is not immediately apparent how to reconcile the Jain and Neufeld 
opinions, beyond the basic recognition that the physician-patient 
relationship may, at least in certain circumstances, be sufficient to qualify 
as a fiduciary relationship under the honest services theory. Perhaps the 
facts of Neufeld were more compelling, given that Caremark already had 
pleaded guilty to nearly identical allegations of defrauding the federal 
health care programs by paying physicians to refer patients to the 
company. 19 Or perhaps the difference can be explained by the different 
burdens required to survive Dr. Neufeld's motion to dismiss as compared to 
that required to overturn Dr. Jain's conviction. Regardless, the dissonance 
has made it difficult to assess the likely approach to be taken in future 
healthcare honest services cases. 
What is clear, however, is that to the extent the Skilling opinion functions 
as an open invitation to bring honest services cases based on bribery and 
kickbacks, we are likely to see more of these healthcare cases in the future. 
Of course, from one perspective this may not matter. The government 
already prosecutes mail and wire fraud cases involving healthcare kickback 
schemes in which money or property has travelled through the mail or wires 
(either for the kickback itself or for subsequent claims for services). 
Skilling does not change this, and an additional honest services count might 
be well be considered overkill in many of these cases. 
Nonetheless, bringing AKS allegations as honest services mail and wire 
fraud prosecutions may provide certain strategic advantages to the 
government. When cases go to trial, it can be extremely compelling to 
focus the jury on the physician-patient relationship as the locus of the 
honest services breach: patients are far more sympathetic victims than 
insurers and government agencies. Moreover, mail and wire fraud provide 
a distinct advantage at the negotiation and plea bargaining stage: the 
18. Id. at 500. 
19. See Press Release, DOJ, Caremark to Pay $161 Million in Fraud and Kickback 
Cases (June 16, 1995), http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/Pre _96/June95/342. txt.html. 
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statutory maximum penalty for AKS violations is five years in prison, 
compared to twenty years for mail and wire fraud. 2° Finally,§ 1346 applies 
not only to mail and wire fraud but also to the rest of 18 U.S.C. chapter 63, 
which includes the HIP AA Health Care Fraud crime prohibiting a scheme 
or artifice to defraud any healthcare benefit program.21 The penalties are ten 
years in prison generally, twenty years if a violation results in serious 
bodily injury, and up to life imprisonment if the violation results in death. 
While few (if any) health care fraud cases so far appear to be based on a 
kickback-related honest services theory, Skilling invites additional 
prosecutions here as well, particularly where a death has resulted. 
V. CONCLUSION 
The Skilling opinion is widely perceived to have closed the door to 
several types of common mail and wire fraud prosecutions. This may not, 
however, turn out to be the case in health care. The renewed focus on 
kickbacks as evidence of an honest services breach instead may dovetail 
nicely with both the Obama Administration's emphasis on criminal health 
care fraud enforcement and the jurisprudence of the AKS itself. In the 
current "law enforcement" climate for healthcare fraud, this kind of 
leverage may prove very difficult for prosecutors to resist - and most 
certainly will require changes in the way the health law bar approaches 
common anti-kickback concerns. 
20. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1341, 1343; 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7b(b)(2011). 
21. 18 U.S.C. § 1347 (2011). 
